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Abstract
Background
As in many health care systems, some Canadian jurisdictions have begun shifting away
from global hospital budgets. Payment for episodes of care has begun to be implemented.
Starting in 2012, the Province of Ontario implemented hospital funding reforms comprising
three elements: Global Budgets; Health Based Allocation Method (HBAM); and Quality-
Based Procedures (QBP). This evaluation focuses on implementation of QBPs, a proce-
dure/diagnosis-specific funding approach involving a pre-set price per episode of care cou-
pled with best practice clinical pathways. We examined whether or not there was consensus
in understanding of the program theory underpinning QBPs and how this may have influ-
enced full and effective implementation of this innovative funding model.
Methods
We undertook a formative evaluation of QBP implementation. We used an embedded case
study method and in-depth, one-on-one, semi-structured, telephone interviews with key
informants at three levels of the health care system: Designers (those who designed the
QBP policy); Adoption Supporters (organizations and individuals supporting adoption of
QBPs); and Hospital Implementers (those responsible for QBP implementation in hospitals).
Thematic analysis involved an inductive approach, incorporating Framework analysis to
generate descriptive and explanatory themes that emerged from the data.
Results
Five main findings emerged from our research: (1) Unbeknownst to most key informants,
there was neither consistency nor clarity over time among QBP designers in their under-
standing of the original goal(s) for hospital funding reform; (2) Prior to implementation, the
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191996 January 26, 2018 1 / 18
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPENACCESS
Citation: Palmer KS, Brown AD, Evans JM, Marani
H, Russell KK, Martin D, et al. (2018) Qualitative
analysis of the dynamics of policy design and
implementation in hospital funding reform. PLoS
ONE 13(1): e0191996. https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0191996
Editor: Gianni Virgili, Universita degli Studi di
Firenze, ITALY
Received: May 14, 2017
Accepted: January 14, 2018
Published: January 26, 2018
Copyright: © 2018 Palmer et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: Our underlying raw
data (i.e. 45 audio recordings and transcripts of
those recordings) contain potentially identifying
contextual information that might reveal the
identity and/or location of key informants. As such,
the approving REB required that we commit to
storing our data “under lock and key at WCRI.” Any
release of data to other parties will likely require a
new ethics approval. Requests by qualified
researchers to access our raw data may, therefore,
be made to the REB at Women’s College Hospital
via the Women’s College Research Institute Ethics
intended hospital funding mechanism transitioned from ABF to QBPs, but most key
informants were either unaware of the transition or believe it was intentional; (3) Percep-
tion of the primary goal(s) of the policy reform continues to vary within and across all lev-
els of key informants; (4) Four years into implementation, the QBP funding mechanism
remains misunderstood; and (5) Ongoing differences in understanding of QBP goals
and funding mechanism have created challenges with implementation and difficulties in
measuring success.
Conclusions
Policy drift and policy layering affected both the goal and the mechanism of action of hospital
funding reform. Lack of early specification in both policy goals and hospital funding mecha-
nism exposed the reform to reactive changes that did not reflect initial intentions. Several
challenges further exacerbated implementation of complex hospital funding reforms, includ-
ing a prolonged implementation schedule, turnover of key staff, and inconsistent messaging
over time. These factors altered the trajectory of the hospital funding reforms and created
confusion amongst those responsible for implementation. Enacting changes to hospital
funding policy through a process that is transparent, collaborative, and intentional may
increase the likelihood of achieving intended effects.
Introduction
As health care systems around the world undergo reform, governments seek to simultaneously
control growth in health care spending, improve the patient care experience, and advance pop-
ulation health outcomes–the Triple Aim [1]. One major policy lever for the attainment of such
goals is the method of financing health care institutions and providers. Hospital funding
reform is thus a common feature of health system restructuring and transformation efforts
globally. In its current iteration, hospital funding reform in developed nations often involves
concurrent initiatives that attempt to promote accountability through greater transparency
[2], improve adherence to evidence-based clinical guidelines [3], expand volume of activity
[4], and/or assure equitable access to hospital services [5].
As part of this wave of reforms, some jurisdictions in Canada have recently begun to shift
away from global hospital budgets, and instead towards payment for episodes of care based on
diagnoses or procedures. For example, Ontario’s Ministry of Health and Long Term Care
(MoHLTC) announced that as of April 1, 2011 it would begin a multi-year implementation of
“patient-based” payment for hospitals [6], [7]. This occurred within the context of a challeng-
ing financial environment that focused a number of policy areas on cost control. The stated
goals of the hospital funding reform that subsequently unfolded were aimed at providing “bet-
ter care for patients at less cost” [8], driving a more sustainable health care system through
smarter use of limited resources, and moving away from global budgets (except for small hos-
pitals and forensic mental health services) by tying funding more directly to the quality of care
provided to patients [9], [10].
Ultimately, “patient-based” hospital financing was implemented in nearly all Ontario hospi-
tals through two new funding components intended to partially replace global budgets: the
Health Based Allocation Method (HBAM), and Quality-Based Procedures (QBP). QBPs were
first implemented in Ontario acute care hospitals in April 2012, with a phase-in over time that
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was intended to allow service providers to anticipate changes and plan for impacts [10]. As
there is only one public payer in Ontario for all medically necessary hospital and physician
care, and all providers participate in that single funding network, payment policies affect entire
classes of hospitals, hospital systems, and health care providers. The only Ontario hospitals
excluded from the QBP funding reform were those with unique features that led government
to consider them exceptions. Specifically, Ontario’s 55 small hospitals – typically less than
2700 inpatient or day-surgery cases per year in two of the last three years—are excluded from
QBP funding component and continue to be funded primarily through global budgets. Like-
wise, specialty hospitals such as mental health or children’s hospitals, as well as chronic care
and rehabilitation hospitals, are also excluded or have only implemented specific QBPs for
their patient populations (e.g. tonsillectomy). However, quality elements of the QBP strategy,
such as those related to performance management, also apply to small hospitals even though
they are excluded from the funding component. Likewise, major investments in standardized
order sets linked to QBPs include small hospitals. Practically, this means that small hospitals
have had performance management supports around QBPs and some limited expectation of
focussing on improving QBPs, but the overwhelming focus of the QBP strategy has been on
community and large hospitals.
QBPs are similar in some, but not all, respects to activity-based funding (ABF) reforms
[11]. As implemented in Ontario, QBPs involve two components: 1) pre-set reimbursement
rates for management of patients with specific diagnoses or who undergo specific procedures
(consistent with ABF); and 2) evidence-based, best-practice clinical pathways, incorporated
into extensive implementation handbooks, intended to guide the provision of care for each
QBP. Financial incentives, coupled with promotion of best-practice pathways, were together
intended to reduce variation in clinical practice, so that patients receive “the right care, in the
right place, at the right time” [8].
The unique combination of QBP, HBAM, and global budget funding represents a made-in-
Ontario solution, the first major change in Ontario’s hospital funding mechanisms since the
introduction of global budgets in 1969 [12].
To date, there has been no evaluation of the implementation of QBPs. In this paper, we
report on our independent, formative evaluation of QBP implementation, in which we exam-
ined whether or not there was consensus in understanding of the program theory [13], [14]
underpinning QBPs (i.e. points of agreement and disagreement about how the policy is under-
stood to work in the field vs. how it was intended to work) and how this may have affected
implementation. Implementation fidelity is the degree to which an intervention is imple-
mented as intended by the developers [15–17]. Fidelity acts as a mediator of the relationship
between interventions and their intended outcomes [15]. In other words, assessment of the
fidelity with which QBPs were implemented may help prevent potentially false conclusions
from being drawn about their effectiveness.
Methods
We used an embedded case study method [18] and undertook in-depth, one-on-one, semi-
structured, telephone interviews with key informants, each working at one of three levels
within the health care system: (Level 1) individuals who conceived of, and were involved in the
design of, the QBP policy; (Level 2) individuals in organizations supporting QBP adoption in
hospitals across the system; and (Level 3) individuals in hospitals responsible for QBP imple-
mentation. An embedded case study allows for in-depth review of new or unclear phenomena
while “retaining the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” [19], as well as
for an appreciation of critical elements of context that are essential to understanding policy
Dynamics of policy design and implementation in hospital funding reform
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design and implementation [20]. Case study is one technique consistent with ’realistic evalua-
tion’, which aims to find not only which outcomes were produced from interventions but also
how they were produced, and in which contextual conditions [21]. We received ethics
approval from the Women’s College Research Institute Research Ethics Board.
We also undertook selective document review of both publicly available and proprietary
sources (i.e. emails shared with the research team from key informants), which provided back-
ground information that was helpful in contextualizing our research [22]. From these docu-
ments we abstracted background data on hospital funding reform characteristics (i.e.
proportion of intended vs achieved for each of the funding schemes) and on the QBP phase-in
schedule. We verified these data with key informants, correcting inaccuracies in publicly avail-
able documents when informants provided updated information from more reliable proprie-
tary sources.
Recruitment
We purposively sampled, seeking information-rich cases while ensuring broad representation,
thus allowing for a comparison of commonalities and differences across groups.
For policy designers (Level 1) and adoption supporters (Level 2), we created a list of poten-
tial key informants through discussion with research team members and through review of
government and Ontario Hospital Association documentation on hospital funding reform
and related policies. One team member (AB) directly emailed these individuals to seek their
participation and to facilitate communication between them and the interviewer (KP), who
subsequently scheduled and conducted telephone interviews with those who agreed to
participate.
For hospital implementers (Level 3), we selected hospitals to invite through a multiple-
stage, stratified, purposeful, sampling approach, aided by Qualtrics1 online survey software.
First, we solicited survey input from executives in 14 Local Health Integration Networks
(responsible for planning, integrating, and funding local health care), the Ontario Hospital
Association, and Cancer Care Ontario (a provincial agency and primary adviser on cancer ser-
vices, with a province-wide initiative—Access to Care [23], [24]—to monitor and improve
wait times for key healthcare services). These respondents were well-positioned to comment
on hospital success or lack thereof with respect to QBPs because of their role in system over-
sight and support. We asked respondents to independently and confidentially select three
higher performing hospitals with regard to QBPs and three hospitals with the most room for
improvement (lower performing) from among the initial 71 hospitals implementing QBPs,
explaining the basis for each selection. We then classified hospitals as follows: within each of
the higher/lower performing categories identified we stratified according to academic and
community hospitals, and further stratified community hospitals by size (large vs. small) and
geographic location (rural vs. urban). We ultimately selected three academic/teaching hospitals
(two higher performing; one lower); and two community hospitals (one higher performing;
one lower). Together, these five hospitals allowed for rich data and we achieved informational
redundancy.
Within hospitals, we initially sought to interview four key hospital employee leadership
groups: 1) chief executive (e.g. CEO); 2) financial/decision support (e.g. Chief Financial Offi-
cer-CFO); 3) clinical (e.g. VP/ExecutiveVP Clinical Affairs); 4) and medical (e.g. VP Medical
Affairs). We pursued snowball sampling beyond these groups where appropriate. We first con-
tacted each hospital CEO to seek permission to include their facility in our research. If they
agreed, we asked the CEOs to identify, and connect our team with, key individuals in each hos-
pital leadership group. All interviews were voluntary and confidential.
Dynamics of policy design and implementation in hospital funding reform
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191996 January 26, 2018 4 / 18
Data collection and management
One trained interviewer (KP) conducted all interviews by telephone, following a semi-struc-
tured guide to capture information relevant to our research questions. Interviews were audio
recorded, professionally transcribed, and de-identified using a unique numerical identifier for
each informant, with the data and key code securely stored at Women’s College Research Insti-
tute. The interview guide (S1 File) included an introduction, key questions, probing questions,
closing questions, and a summary; it was beta tested with key informants and experts and
refined prior to commencing the formal interviews. The interviewer made summary case
notes immediately after each interview. As key themes were identified during the interviews,
they informed the interview guide in an iterative manner so that emerging issues of interest
could be pursued. We continued to seek further information at all Levels until researchers
agreed that saturation was reached. At Level 3, we sought within-case saturation (i.e. within
each case study hospital).
Analysis approach
Thematic analysis [25] involved an inductive approach, incorporating Framework analysis
[26] to generate descriptive and explanatory themes as they emerged from the data. The analy-
sis process included familiarization by immersion in the data, identifying a thematic frame-
work to guide coding, iteratively refining a codebook, indexing and charting the data, and
mapping/interpretation [27], [28]. Themes were generated from the data through open (unre-
stricted) coding to create a template of codes. Two members of the research team (KP, JE)
independently open coded two test transcripts to generate themes, then collaboratively recon-
ciled and revised their coding. Using this template of codes, two other members of the research
team (HM, KR) then independently coded the first few key informant interview transcripts,
comparing and reconciling their coding until they achieved at least 70% agreement on code
selection. At that point, duplicate coding was abandoned because of high coherence of coding,
but coders consulted with senior members of the research team regularly and whenever coding
questions arose. The codebook was iteratively refined throughout the coding process as new
concepts became apparent, until no additional codes emerged. Assisted by Quirkos1 qualita-
tive data analysis software to facilitate coding, analysis, and data management, we used line-
by-line coding and constant comparative methods to understand what was happening with
QBPs. Key themes were then independently identified by each of the coders and senior
researchers for discussion; upon consensus, data were curated accordingly. Finally, we orga-
nized key themes by level of respondent to facilitate comparisons. One researcher (KP) initially
identified representative quotations for each key theme, and obtained concensus from NI, AB,
JE, and DM. From this we generated meaning by building a logical chain of evidence that was
conceptually and theoretically coherent [29]. Validity procedures employed included triangu-
lation to corroborate or refine our findings, seeking disconfirming evidence, researcher reflex-
ivity, peer debriefing, and member checking (i.e. with selected Levels 1 and 2 informants) [30],
[31].
Results
We interviewed 45 key informants between May 18-October 6, 2016, including 12 designers
(Level 1), 11 adoption supporters (Level 2), and 22 hospital implementers (Level 3, from 5 case
study hospitals). There were no refusals. Interviews ranged from 43–107 minutes in length. In
the representative quotes selected here, research team members are designated as “R” and key
informant participants as “P”.We also abstracted background information from three key pub-
licly available documents [7], [9], [32].
Dynamics of policy design and implementation in hospital funding reform
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As described in Table 1, QBPs were phased-in over time, with funds being reallocated from
hospitals’ global budgets to their QBP funding envelopes. Starting in FY 2012, for example,
four QBPs were introduced, accounting for 6% of the total funding allocation. This was fol-
lowed in FY 2013 by six more new QBPs, accounting for a combined total of 12% of the hospi-
tal funding allocation. Annually since 2012, new QBPs have been phased-in, with
commensurate QBP funding incrementally replacing other funding envelopes. Since FY 2014,
however, the proportion of actual QBP funding has been half of intended. For example, as of
FY 2016 only 15% of hospital funding was allocated for QBPs rather than the intended 30%.
Main finding 1
Unbeknownst to most key informants, there was neither consistency nor clarity over time
among QBP designers in their understanding of the original goal(s) for hospital funding
reform.
Table 1. Ontario hospital funding reform characteristics and phase-in schedule [7], [9], [32].
Global budget: fixed annual amount based on historical spending to cover operating expenses, originally intended to comprise 30% of the funding allocation
(previously comprised 98.5% of the hospital budget); also includes other targeted funding and post-construction operating costs associated with completion of capital
projects
Health Based Allocation Model (HBAM): organizational-level funding based on characteristics of services provided and profile of patients served, originally intended
to comprise 40% of the funding allocation (previously comprised 1.5% of the hospital budgets)
Quality-based procedures (QBPs): procedure/diagnosis-specific funding, based on a pre-set price per episode (calculated at the 40th percentile of average costs
incurred by all hospitals), coupled with best practice clinical pathways, intended to comprise 30% of the funding allocation (a novel and unique feature of hospital
funding reform)
Funding Reform FY2011-
12
Pre-QBP
FY2012-13
Phase 1
FY2013-14
Phase 2
FY2014-15
Phase 3
FY2015-16 FY2016-17
QBPs intended
% funding
0% 6% 15% 30% 30% 30%
QBPs actual %
funding
0% 6% 12% 13% 14% 15%
QBPs added by
year
none primary unilateral hip
replacement
primary unilateral
knee replacement
unilateral cataract
chronic kidney disease
(dialysis)
chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease
congestive heart failure
stroke
non-cardiac vascular surgery
systemic chemotherapy
gastrointestinal endoscopy
hip fracture
pneumonia
tonsillectomy
neonatal jaundice
bilateral hip and knee
replacement
knee arthroscopy
cancer surgery
(prostate,
colorectal)
cancer surgery
(breast, thyroid)
non-routine and
bilateral cataract
HBAM intended
% funding
1.5% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40%
HBAM actual
% funding
0% 34% 34% 33% 32% 32%
Global Budget
intended
% funding
98.5% 54% 45% 30% 30% 30%
Global Budget
actual
% funding
100% 60% 54% 54% 54% 54%
 introduced/communicated as QBPs in 2013/14, but funding change took effect in 2014/15
 personal communication, Health System Quality and Funding Division, Ontario MoHLTC
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191996.t001
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QBP designers espoused a variety of goals, including improving access, efficiency, transpar-
ency, clinical leadership engagement, and reducing variation in cost and/or clinical outcomes.
In the absence of commitment to a common goal(s), over time the hospital funding reform
policy emphasized a desire to reduce variation in both cost and treatment approach.
Designers. “The original objective and intent is really about engaging clinical leadership
with best practice and ensuring that clinical leaders within a hospital are engaged with the
hospital administration.” Level 1–006
“The goal of QBPs is to use the financial lever to drive quality improvement by establishing
really clear prices for different procedures within the hospital setting that correspond with
evidence of best practice, with the intent of trying to reduce clinical and practice variation
across different hospitals.” Level 1–008
“Ithe goal of QBPs is to use the financial lever to drive quality improvement by establishing realed
beyond very high level and broad sort of terms. And they necessarily involve a whole bunch of
challenges around communicating them clearly because of their clinical nature.” Level 1–003
Main finding 2
Prior to implementation, the intended hospital funding mechanism transitioned from ABF to
QBPs, but most key informants were either unaware of the transition or believe it was
intentional.
The original plan for the reformed hospital funding mechanism in Ontario was a simple
ABF approach using a price per category of admission (i.e. diagnosis or procedure), with only
a minority of overall hospital funding through a global budget. Instead, by the time the reform
was implemented, it had become QBPs, retaining the price per volume formula characteristic
of ABF, but coupling that with two other funding mechanisms (global budgets and HBAM),
and with an unfunded quality overlay intended to encourage adherence to clinical pathways.
This overlay took many forms, from the handbooks and pathways previously described that
were intended to have an exhortational or educational impact, to performance reports for
some types of QBPs that included a small set of process and/or outcome indicators.
The hospital funding mechanism morphed from a relatively simple funding formula closely
aligned with ABF—[(Rate x volume) +/- global budget]—to an elaborate funding formula—
[(rate x volume) with a quality overlay] + [global budget] + [HBAM]. The inclusion of a quality
overlay appears be have been added to increase the likelihood of clinician engagement in orga-
nizational change efforts.
Designers. “I have been in on it since the beginning. So, I have got a pretty consistent,
clear idea of how it started and what the idea is and how we were going to roll this out. But
you go and ask people in the field, sometimes it’s a bit of a black box. They don’t always . . .
it hasn’t been really well-communicated and well-transitioned to the field.” Level 1–004
“The idea was let’s expand activity-based funding across basically all activity that we can mea-
sure, and the idea then will be everything is now on some sort of a revenue basis, and hospitals
then won’t be faced with, well, this procedure doesn’t bring us in any new revenue, so we’ll do
less of this. Instead, it’s more a matter of sorting things out according to need, access, and effi-
ciency. That was a key difference between what we proposed around the policy for patient-
based payments and what actually ended up happening with QBPs.” Level 1–014
“There was tension between ADMs [Assistant Deputy Ministers] and the people who work
with them who favour HBAM and the others who favoured QBPs. So, there was tension
between which one works better for a certain period of time.” Level 1–011
Dynamics of policy design and implementation in hospital funding reform
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Adoption Supporters. “. . .it was always that, first, we’re going to introduce the rate by
volume funding and then, we’ll introduce the quality overlay.” Level 2–018
Hospital Implementers. “R: Do you know whether other mechanisms than QBPs were
considered for achieving the goals that you mentioned? P: I think there was something
before that, but I just don’t remember.” Level 3–034
“R: Do you know if they considered other mechanisms to achieve that same goal? P: You
know what, I don’t know.” Level 3–040
Main finding 3
Perception of the primary goal(s) of the policy reform continues to vary within and across all
levels of key informants.
Four years after their introduction, there is still a lack of consensus across policy designers,
adoption supporters, and hospital implementers and, in particular, among hospital implemen-
ters, regarding the specific goals of QBPs and how the hospital funding mechanism is meant to
support achievement of these goals. The multifaceted intentions had narrowed to an emphasis
on reducing variation in cost and in patient outcomes. However, there remains disagreement
about the primary goal. Many adoption supporters and hospital-implementers believe that
QBPs are mostly intended to control costs by reducing length of stay; others reported the
intent is primarily to enhance quality of patient care by reducing treatment variation. Some
key informants feel they are meant to do both, while others question the extent to which these
two goals could be simultaneously achieved. Across levels, there was not agreement on
whether or not the goals had changed over time.
Designers. “I think the goals of the system have changed over time now and are much
more focused on the appropriateness or the effectiveness of care. Still somewhat focused on
the costs or the costs per unit of care but I’m not sure that access is still the goal of the
QBPs. And I’m not sure that the productivity of the system is still the goal of the QBPs,
given that the portion of funding that’s allocated to QBPs is lower now than it was originally
intended to be.” Level 1–003
“I think the goals have not changed.” Level 1–011
Adoption Supporters. “The goal of QBPs is to do a better job of better tying funding to
quality.” Level 2–012
“So the real goal was to save money.” Level 2–021
“The stated goal was all about improving the quality of care.” Level 2–018
Hospital Implementers. “Is this about quality or is this about saving money? I mean, the
theory is that if you standardize care and make care better, costs should fall, but there is, I
think, some cynicism in the field about what’s the real goal here. Is the real goal just to save
money or is the real goal to improve care?” Level 3–022
“I’ll say the government’s goal is to reduce cost and our goal is to improve patient care.”
Level 3–038
Dynamics of policy design and implementation in hospital funding reform
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“I think the goal is to provide the best patient experience, outcomes, through a standardised
process that all the hospitals follow, that’s good for the patient, good for the system, and it’s
done economically.” Level 3–027
“I don’t believe they could improve quality of patient care. I believe they’re there to stan-
dardize and to reduce costs and consolidate.” Level 3–033
“my gut tells me that the government’s goals changed a little over time. I think that they
probably started with a cost-savings or a cost-control . . . a true need to do that. I get it. And
I think that . . . but to be responsible, well, it has to be quality care. It can’t be just any old
care. It has got to meet a minimum standard. It has to be good care. And so, I think they
started out with focusing on both sides. But you’re right, the emphasis, I believe, was origi-
nally much more on financial than on outcomes for patients. And I feel now that when you
approach it from the outcomes for patients, it does change things a little.” Level 3–042
“When we talk to our clinicians, they don’t see the ‘Q’ for quality in QBPs. They think it’s a
purely financial focus.” Level 3–025
“I do not consider QBPs a quality metric, to be really, 100% blunt. . .My only point is,
nobody has that conversation, when you’re actually a hospital . . . when we get our numbers,
I don’t hear everybody rushing into my office saying, oh my God, we did so well on QBPs
this year, we had such better outcomes of patient experience. I hear, and I hear from my col-
leagues, oh, how did you do on QBPs, did you lose or did you gain money. Then, it’s not a
quality indicator.” Level 3–031
“To be crass, QBPs are really more about funding than they are about quality at this point
in their evolution.” Level 3–037
Main finding 4
Four years into implementation, the QBP funding mechanism remains misunderstood.
Four years into implementation, QBP stakeholders continue to vary in their under-
standing of the QBP funding mechanism. Some correctly reported that each QBP price is
calculated from a pre-specified rate x volume (i.e. ABF) payment scheme; some mistakenly
believed each QBP price is based on the actual cost to provide care described in each best-
practice pathway; others mistakenly believe payment is contingent on demonstrated
adherence to specific quality standards, even though this originally envisioned financial
connection between quality and cost was never implemented when QBPs were rolled out.
Although policy documents emphasize quality, hospital funding is not tied to patient out-
comes or adherence to best practice.
Designers. “. . . we have the means to basically classify all acute inpatient and day surgery
activity done in the hospitals. And, because we can do that, we can also assign a price based
on average cost to start with, but maybe moving towards introducing these sorts of best-
practice prices in certain areas.” Level 1–014
“. . . take a particular procedure, look at what would be the best quality way in which that
procedure could be delivered through the use of an expert panel in terms of that process,
and then be able to set a price based on what the best quality could be delivered for that
price.” Level 1–004
“So, to be really clear, we don’t price the pathway itself. We just identify the average cost of
current service delivery. And if we priced the pathway, we might see something quite differ-
ent. We might not be able to afford it. (Laughter) I don’t know.” Level 1–006
Dynamics of policy design and implementation in hospital funding reform
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“the handbook is then priced to determine what is the best practice price associated with
the quality or the pathway. R: So, did you say that that pricing occurred based on that clini-
cal pathway? P: That’s right. R: So, to your understanding, the cost of the pathway itself was
costed out? P: Yes.” Level 1–007
“it’s very clear that, as a whole, we don’t really understand what health system funding
reform and QBP is all about as a whole. And, so, we just leave it to the CFO and kind of
trust she holds judgment on that. Most of us don’t even know what the right questions are
to ask health management when it comes to these matters.” Level 1–008
Adoption Supporters. “the quantity of funds provided for a given procedure were based
on the costing of what ideal care would be.” Level 2–015
“at the outset, it was stated that there would be, it was implied or stated, explicitly, that there
would be money ties to quality. In fact, there was this sort of famous line, where it said
something like payment equals rate times volume plus quality. Obviously, a notional for-
mula, but never was clear how that quality part would be paid and for which QBPs and
how, for each QBP. I don’t think it’s really been implemented for any. So, effectively, it’s a
rate by volume funding mechanism.” Level 2–018
Hospital Implementers. “based on case costing information, we know that doing a hip
costs X in the province. And when you take a look at that, they picked the 40th percentile
and said, bing, that’s the number and that’s what you’re going to get paid.” Level 3–023
“Thated on case costing information, wcertain goals and initiatives for the QBPs, then
you’ll actually be rewarded an amount of money that is distributed. And, I don’t think it’s
distributed equally among the hospitals, it’s based on performance. R: So, you understand it
more to be a pay-for-performance mechanism, in a sense. P: Certainly paid for better out-
comes.” Level 3–029
“I would say that they did not cost quality indicators in the costing. They have quality indi-
cators that you should be tracking as part of a QBP, but to my understanding, they have
never used quality indicators to negatively or positively impact a hospital in Ontario. There
has been a lot of talk about it, but we have never gone there.” Level 3–025
Main finding 5
Ongoing differences in understanding of QBP goals and funding mechanism have created
challenges with implementation and difficulties in measuring success.
Lack of clarity and consensus on the goals and uncertainty about how the policy will evolve
both act as barriers to measuring whether the desired changes in hospitals have been achieved.
The tension created by the need to balance multiple goals (cost versus quality; efficiency versus
patient experience) was often apparent. However, the pressure to implement, and the explicit
link between revenue generation and volume, has focused attention for implementation on
finance executives (e.g. CFO), rather than on quality and patient safety managers. This has led
to some reported success around shortening LOS to manage cost, but without robust data to
assess effects on quality and other outcomes.
Designers. “I think there’s an element of simplicity and elegance that was part of the origi-
nal thinking of just sending a price signal well in advance and letting hospitals have enough
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time to adjust that feels like is kind of lost somewhere along the way. And QBPs just feels,
like I said, complicated for the un-initiated.” Level 1–008
“I think, a significant challenge in the implementation of QBPs, is that there has been no
clarity as to what the primary purpose is.” Level 1–045
“It feels like QBP has, over time, attracted more of the attention of the CFO types than the
quality types within the hospital setting, for better or for worse. That’s my observation.”
Level 1–008
Adoption supporters. “What we should have had was a collective think about how to do
it. And that did come later, where they started to say, well, what has everybody done and
what worked. But it sort of came after the fact.” Level 2–012
“If it’s not fully articulated, it’s this high level that we’re going to tie funding to quality and
the whole world will be better but there’s no articulation of how do we actually measure
that. The objectives aren’t clear enough for us to know. So to go back to even your earlier
question, once it was implemented, I don’t know. I don’t know the measures that are out
there to even tell me that some of them have been implemented, other than a process mea-
sure that says someone wrote a handbook. Nobody is measuring the quality of delivery
according to best practice, so how would we know?” Level 2–021
Hospital Implementers. “There’s very little outcome data available to us for anything that
we do with patients. That’s one of the things I think the whole system grapples with. We
have lots of process indicators. We don’t have a lot of outcome indicators.” Level 3–022
“The initial introduction wasn’t done well unfortunately because of the introduction of a
40th percentile arbitrary price point, so that right away made it a cost thing and not a qual-
ity thing and the whole thing started to lose a lot of credibility with clinicians and the ser-
vices really. . . No one has shown me any information that would say, you know what, we’ve
mapped out and costed the perfect care pathway for the CMG, and when you do that, this is
what you should have. You should have a length of stay at this. You should have nursing
coverage at that. You should have this and that. . . to provide all the appropriate operational
guidance, clinical guidance, to hit the mark that was I think fully intended at the outset.”
Level 3–023
“increasingly, money is being taken out of global and being put into HBAM and QBP. And
so, it’s an evil funding formula where the total size of the pie doesn’t increase and these are
all funding allocation mechanisms as between service providers.” Level 3–024
Discussion
In Ontario, QBPs represent an important component of hospital funding with the potential
for significant impact on hospital policy, care delivery, and budgets. However, as illustrated in
Fig 1, several factors adversely affected the implementation of QBPs.
Policy drift is the phenomenon of sometimes oblique transformations [33], [34]. Policy lay-
ering refers to the grafting of new elements onto an otherwise stable framework [35], [36]. In
QBPs, we see a slowly evolving policy reform, stretched out over many years, with associated
variation both in understanding of goals—an example of policy drift—and in the funding
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reform mechanism—an example of policy layering. Gradual drift in the policy goals, arising
from incomplete policy design and specification, changed the intent of the policy; confusing or
self-contradictory elements began creeping into the policy text (Main Findings 1, 3, 5). Policy
layering altered the mechanism of action—changing it from the originally conceived formula
(i.e. rate x volume, plus a small global budget) to the formula that was eventually implemented
(i.e. rate x volume, plus HBAM, plus an even smaller global budget)—thereby further shifting
the overall trajectory of the reform (Main Findings 2, 4 5). In this way, our research demon-
strates how incomplete policy design, incomplete policy specification, and policy drift,
together with policy layering, can exacerbate the challenges of implementing funding reform
policies in complex adaptive health care systems [37].
What conditions on the ground led to the series of reactions that changed the design, pur-
pose, and construct of the policy [38]? In the case of QBPs, a major transition in funding
mechanism was apparently a compromise that evolved organically, rather than by intentional
design, with the need for compromise stemming from a lack of consistency in the perceived
goals and how best to achieve them. This started with changes in key staff during the design
phase, leading to a lack of consistent messaging within the central planning level. The reform
goals and funding mechanism were not anchored by a stable, open policy table, meaning there
was not a transparent approach to policy design and implementation, involving a consistent
cadre of stakeholders who gather regularly, nor a clearly articulated set of policy goals and
mechanisms of action to preserve institutional memory [39]. An open policy table could also
help to address changes in staffing, a common element of modern public services in which
generalist public service leaders are expected to move between roles and to understand all
aspects of government [40], but which can limit the duration of expert champions to shepherd
reforms. Without consistent champions, weak signals in the communication feedback loop
enabled a shift in political attention away from the original goals and mechanism of action.
This led to a lack of “stickiness” of the original policy, resulting in policy drift and policy layer-
ing. This was likely exacerbated by staff experiencing reform fatigue [41] from too much
change, given that QBPs were implemented at the end of a long string of previous health sys-
tem reforms—31 reforms in all—that began in 2000 [42].
In Ontario, the transition from originally envisioning the implementation of a relatively
simple ABF model, to ultimately enacting a more complex hospital funding model, along with
ongoing evolution of the policy goals and funding mechanism, has contributed to challenges
aligning funding mechanism with policy intent. This, in turn, has made it harder to evaluate
or achieve the policy goals. Changes over time, in both the goals and funding reform mecha-
nism, reduced implementation fidelity, suggesting that potential benefits of the original policy
goal may not be realized. Indeed, the policy may exacerbate the problem it was intended to fix
in the first place. That is, the policy went from a way to protect access to care from the vicissi-
tudes of limited global budgets, to a policy that may reduce access because of volume caps. It
also went from a policy that had little intent of reducing costs, to one with a funding mecha-
nism built to constrain costs.
In many cases, government policies should shift over time—consistent with policy learning
theory [43]—particularly as the context changes, as new evidence on policy effectiveness
emerges, or as the goals of government change. Such shifts should ideally represent purposeful
pivots to achieve high-priority goals rather than be based on inertia [44]. These changes, how-
ever, can be challenging to the implementation and management of policy in complex systems,
in which design, development, support, and implementation are handled at different levels of
the health system, and by different actors with varying levels of capacity.
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Relation to prior work
There is scant research on the implementation of QBPs. We know of only one published study
evaluating health care leaders’ early responses to implementing QBPs [45]. Prior studies have
established the significance of policy drift and layering on social policy reform in, for example,
the US [34], [46], Canada [33], [36], Britain/Sweden [47], Chile [48], and other advanced econ-
omies [49], [50], and on institutional change in several countries [35]. Our research builds on
existing knowledge by applying policy layering and drift (Hacker’s seminal work [34]) to hos-
pital funding reform, demonstrating how these phenomena can be coincident processes. In so
doing, we offer new insight into the effects of policy drift and layering on the design and imple-
mentation of complex public policy.
Fig 1. Simplified schematic of principle findings. The evolution of QBP implementation—some purposeful, some unintentional—started with (A)
incomplete policy design, which (B) influenced the goals of the policy and (C) changed the funding reform mechanism, ultimately (D) altering the
trajectory of the entire hospital funding reform policy.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191996.g001
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Strengths and limitations
Qualitative research has numerous strengths when properly conducted. We discovered subtle-
ties and complexities—often missed by more positivistic enquiries [51]—about the research
topic. However, we acknowledge that qualitative research can be influenced by researcher bias.
Our team members made every effort to think reflexively and openly discuss how personal
experiences and knowledge could affect the analysis process. We systematically acknowledged
preconceived positions, perspectives, assumptions, values, beliefs, and potential biases so they
could be discussed and contested [52]. KP is a health policy analyst and researcher who previ-
ously led a systematic review of activity-based funding [11]; AB is a public policy researcher,
and was previously an Assistant Deputy Minister with the Ontario Ministry of Health and
Long Term Care where he worked with key informants through his involvement in health sys-
tem funding reform; NI and DM are health system researchers and physicians affiliated with
an Ontario hospital, not amongst our case study hospitals. We further mitigated the risk of
bias through a variety of efforts to ensure validity, as described in the Methods. Another disad-
vantage of qualitative approaches is that their findings cannot be directly generalized in the
same way as quantitative approaches [53]. Sampling in qualitative research is not designed to
be representative of wider populations, “but rather purposive to capture a diversity around a
phenomenon [26].” We collected data from a sufficient number of key informants to reach sat-
uration on our findings, which fit within, and contribute to, a wider literature on hospital
funding reforms.
Implications of our findings
It is valuable to understand how policies can evolve in complex settings, particularly in health
system reform where the goals of policies are often multi-dimensional and reflect both evi-
dence and political compromise. A key challenge is to manage this evolution as effectively as
possible. Our findings regarding hospital funding reform may offer lessons in this regard.
In the absence of clear goals, it seems that the QBP funding policy drifted and has become a
base onto which many other policies can be layered. It may be that this murkiness served a
purpose in the early days of the policy, by destabilizing entrenched ways of doing and by allow-
ing different groups to interpret meaning that they found useful in driving implementation.
But if QBPs continue to displace more tranches of global budgets, achieving the goals of hospi-
tal funding reform may require greater clarity on policy goals and more transparent, collabora-
tive, and intentional approaches to implementation.
The history of QBPs in Ontario suggests a need to reduce the potential for further confusion
amongst stakeholders (agencies, associations, and hospitals) that characterized the early phases
of implementation. Despite drift and layering, the current set of Designers have been able to
cultivate a strong relationship with Adoption Supporters enabling them to begin to address the
issues that arose from drift and layering. An open policy table, with public records of discus-
sion, could support a clear, consistent, and enduring understanding of policy goals and
intended mechanisms of action. Broader, more consistent membership at such a table could
reinforce fidelity to policy goals and mechanism, and support buy-in to further changes. Crea-
tion of a shared repository for minutes, presentations, and policy documents, may enable
shared understanding of reforms. The current positive relationships between Designers and
Adoption Supporters, and the strong relationships between Adoption Supporters and Hospital
Implementers suggest that this tactic could facilitate implementation.
Adoption Supporters and Hospital Implementers have been generally receptive to the qual-
ity goals of QBPs. The current approach to calculating the price for QBPs at the 40th percentile
of average costs incurred by all hospitals all but guarantees achieving cost-containment goals.
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Yet, the lack of a direct connection between the clinical care pathway and payment for that
care (or measurement of quality) makes the connection between improved patient outcomes
and cost unclear. If the primary goal of the hospital funding reform remains two-fold (i.e.
reduce costs and improve quality), then a more explicit link between reimbursement and evi-
dence-based clinical pathways might allow the funding reform mechanism to become more
aligned with this two-fold policy goal. A more explicit link could help address the tension
experienced in the field between the cost and quality goals. However, evidence to date [54],
[55] suggests that such highly engineered links may result in unintended negative conse-
quences, or may not achieve desired outcomes without other implementation supports, thus
making ongoing evaluation of such links essential. Simultaneously improving quality and
reducing costs is most feasible when variation in cost and quality are due to provision of low-
value care [56]. Outside of this situation, it may be necessary to have unique system and/or
clinical policies for specific, focused goals.
Policies like QBPs that focus on particular procedures or diagnoses could potentially mar-
ginalize physicians or hospitals who do not provide QBP procedures or treat patients with
QBP diagnoses. There is a risk of systematic preferential attention to QBPs at the expense of
non-QBP care—cherry picking—resulting in less managerial attention or fewer quality
improvement initiatives for non-QBP care, or preferential selection of QBP patients. This is in
line with literature on how performance measurement (and performance management more
generally) can lead to a form of myopia or synecdoche (taking a part to stand for a whole) [57].
We found some anecdotal indication of this in our key informant interviews, and are now
undertaking quantitative research to evaluate the effects of QBPs on objective indicators such
as processes of care, hospital coding behaviour, patient characteristics, and patient outcomes
such as length of stay and return to hospital.
Conclusions
We found that the trajectory of hospital funding reform in Ontario was affected by both policy
drift and by policy layering, hazards in any complex system reform. Rather than change occur-
ring by design, the policy reacted organically to changing circumstances on the ground. This
shift was enabled by a lack of specification in the goals and mechanism, such that the potential
impact of the emergent policy no longer reflected the initial intentions. Enacting changes to
hospital funding through a process that is transparent, collaborative, and intentional may
increase the likelihood of achieving intended goals.
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